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Condensational symbols in British press coverage of Boko Haram 
 
Abstract 
This study of British press coverage of Boko Haram, a militant group in Nigeria, concentrates 
on condensational symbols in news reports of one of its major acts of terrorism, the bombing 
of the United Nations House in Abuja, the country’s capital city, in August 2011. The study 
examines the visibility of Boko Haram in British newspapers before and after the attack. It 
identifies the condensational symbols that dominated the coverage and how these provided a 
particular trajectory that could have shaped newspaper readers’ understanding of the event. 
The study argues that the symbolic terms that journalists used in their reports were not only 
easily identifiable but were specifically chosen to simplify a complex story for audiences that 
were perhaps uninformed about the group and its activities. The terms also reflect the 
repertoire of news frames that journalists mine to reconstruct reality for their audiences. 
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Introduction 
Long before the abduction of more than 200 girls from a school in north-eastern Nigeria in 
April 2014, Nigeria had already become ‘a country of interest in the context of terrorism’ (Ette, 
2012:45). Boko Haram, the group that claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of the school 
girls, has been associated with acts of terrorism in the country since 2007. However, the 
unfolding story of Boko Haram remained largely untold in international media until July 2009. 
The group gained visibility in the British press when some of its members engaged in a major 
outbreak of violence that resulted in the death of hundreds of people in the northern part of 
Nigeria. Following on from then, it received intermittent exposure in the British press but in 
August 2011, its visibility in international media increased sharply when it bombed the United 
Nations House in Abuja, the capital city, and confirmed its status as a nascent terrorist group. 
The attack on the UN headquarters in Nigeria reverberated around the world and marked a 
critical moment in the country’s record of acts of terrorism. For the first time in its campaign of 
violence, Boko Haram had attacked an international target. As journalists writing for Western 
media sought to make sense of the tragedy to audiences that were perhaps uninformed about 
the group and its activities in Nigeria, they needed news frames that had resonance for their 
readers and contextualised the story. The apparent absence of obvious conventional news 
values such as cultural proximity and relevance of the event necessitated a perspective that 
could make the attack comprehensible and discernible for audiences. Journalists needed 
framed that were capable of evoking shared memories because, as Tiffen (1989:53) has 
argued, ‘in story selection and presentation there is constant effort to reflect and capture the 
public’s concerns. Stories are presented in a way that maximises their apparent relevance to 
the audience.’  
This article reviews British press coverage of that major act of terrorism by Boko Haram 
to identify the condensational symbols journalists used to contextualise their narratives for 
their audiences, who, perhaps at the time of the incident, had no or limited knowledge about 
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the group and its activities. It takes as a starting point an understanding that journalists as an 
‘interpretative community’ routinely depend on familiar news frames in their coverage of acts 
of terrorism. Dominant news frames in the coverage of international news are often shaped by 
the political, cultural and social background of the reporters and the news organisations they 
represent. This article analyses recurring labels in the coverage of Boko Haram to highlight to 
what extent they were simple description of events or implicit judgement about Nigeria and the 
group. The study focuses on a defining event in the activities of the group: the bombing of the 
UN House in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital city. The study examines how newspapers published in 
the UK by British news organisations reported the attack specifically to delineate the recurring 
symbolic phrases that framed the coverage. 
 
News framing and condensational symbols 
It is common knowledge that journalists invest energy and consideration into the framing of 
their reports because news plays a pivotal role in knowledge formation (Schudson, 1995), 
especially of distant places. Suzanne Franks (2013:3) has noted that the media are 
sometimes ‘the only way of finding out about faraway events’ and places.  Through the use of 
familiar frames of reference, journalists are able to tell stories, especially complex stories of 
events that lie beyond the direct experience of their audiences, in ways that are appealing to 
their readers. Consequently, journalists play a critical role in the shaping of public perception 
of a given issue (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006). Incorporating news frames with ‘identifiable 
conceptual and linguistic characteristics’ (de Vreese et al, 2010:108), can fixate attention on 
certain aspects of an event, and conversely detract scrutiny from others. Norris et al (2003:2) 
argue that ‘journalists rely upon familiar news frames, and upon the interpretation of events 
offered by credible sources, to convey dominant meanings, to make sense of the facts, to 
focus the headlines, and to structure the story line.’ As Yang (2003) explains, the news media 
actively determine the frames of references that audiences depend upon to understand public 
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events. Thus, dominant news frames influence the way in which people think about issues 
raised in news reports and this is particularly significant in the coverage of acts of violence and 
terrorism in distant places. British press reports of the attack on the UN House, for example, 
were undergirded with frames that provided recognisable labels and fitted into typical 
formulaic news frames. The frames provided the scaffolding over the incident and enabled the 
readers to make sense of the story and to apply a particular understanding of it.  
Several references have so far been made to the phrase ‘condensational symbols’ 
without any clarification of its intended meaning in the context of this article. For the purpose 
of this article, a condensational symbol is conceptualised primarily as a shorthand means by 
which an aggregate of beliefs, values, and perhaps worldviews are transmitted to those who 
share similar culture. Condensational symbols evoke ‘stored meanings already residing within 
the minds of individuals sharing a given culture’ (Johnson-Cartee, 2005:167). It is important to 
note that in the context of this study, the ‘labels’ identified as condensational symbols do not 
necessarily condense beliefs in the way terms such as ‘British values’ or ‘the American dream’ 
do  but are signposted as condensational symbols because they provide culturally resonant 
frames for coverage of acts of terrorism. For this study, condensational symbols are phrases 
that through repeated use evoke shared meanings and understanding of terrorism. For 
example, the use of the phrase ‘suicide bomber’ in a story conjures up a range of discourses. 
In the West, for example, a suicide bomber encapsulates a perverse sense of bravery that 
devalues not only the life of targets of a terrorist act but also that of the perpetrator of such an 
act.  However, the idea is understood differently in parts of the world where being a suicide 
bomber is regarded as a demonstration of conviction and commitment to a cause. Or as 
Cottee and Hayward (2011:876) note, suicide bombing is an expression of ‘one of the core 
existential attractions of terrorism: namely, violent struggle and self-sacrifice in service to the 
sacred.’ In places where being a suicide bomber symbolises an act of faith in the promise of a 
reward in the afterlife, it is understandable why family members celebrate the self-sacrifice of 
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loved ones while in the West, such an act is deemed to be an incomprehensible. 
Consequently, in Western media, the use of ‘suicide bomber’ evokes iconic images of terror 
and serves as a cue for a particular understanding of terrorism.  
 
Condensational symbols are embedded in the news frames that journalists use to present 
their narratives. Bennett (1980) explains that such symbols have powerful emotional 
connections with audiences. Condensational symbols are often embedded in interpretative 
packages and informed by news frames and these, Entman (1993:52) suggests are 
‘manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotypical 
images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of 
facts or judgement.’ In his examination of contrasting news frames used by several important 
US media outlets in the coverage of two tragic misapplication of military force, Entman argues 
that ‘the components of the frame often tend to cohere with an established discursive domain, 
a series of associated idea clusters that form a way of reasoning about a matter that is familiar 
to audiences from other cultural experiences. Certain words and images are used repeatedly 
and together, thereby rendered more salient in the texts’ (Entman, 1991:11). 
 News frames entail ‘representing persistent patterns of selection, emphasis, and 
exclusion that furnish a coherent interpretation and evaluation of events’ (Norris et al, 2003:2). 
Pulled together, condensational symbols reflect boundaries of discourse and signify what 
reporters deem to be significant issues in a story. The interpretative packages journalists 
utilise in their coverage of events reflect their socio-political and cultural environment. Thus, it 
could be argued that condensational symbols are culture sensitive and are rooted in specific 
socio-cultural milieu as journalists tend to use labels that resonate with their audiences. 
Condensational symbols simplify the challenge of telling complicated stories by making 
information more salient through ‘placement or repetition, or by associating them with 
culturally familiar symbols’ (Entman, 1993:53). Symbolic words and phrases facilitate the 
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reporting of distant and unfamiliar stories to uninformed audiences because they provide 
journalists with recognisable world views, and expression of value systems that resonate with 
their readers. The point has been made that ‘facts have no intrinsic meaning. They take on 
their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organises them and gives them 
coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasise while ignoring others’ (Gamson, 1989:157, as 
cited by Johnson-Cartee, 2005:158). Conflict situations, such as the bombing of the UN 
headquarters in Nigeria, intensify the need for condensational symbols as they enable 
journalists to present their narratives from an episodic rather than a thematic perspective 
because the latter requires a more textured and contextualised approach that would entail 
providing detailed background while the former emphasises ‘recent alarming or attention-
earning event that highlights an individual’s or group’s plight through personal illustration’ 
(Iyengar,1991, as cited by Johnson-Cartee, 2005:164). Symbolic language is not only 
malleable but it also minimises the need to provide detailed background or context of stories 
over time to facilitate deeper understanding of issues in the news.  
In the coverage of terrorism, certain phrases are routinely used to cue particular 
interpretative packages. For example, Al-Qaeda, conjures up the discourse on the war on 
terror and the label carries certain undertones.  As a condensational symbol, it evokes shared 
memories of the expression of the ideology and activities of the group and it is readily 
understood by audiences who are familiar and knowledgeable about its significance. 
Moreover, a condensational symbol underpins powerful narratives that simplify the social 
construction of reality and communicate a clear message in news stories. As a reporting 
device, condensational symbols transform difficult choices into routine decisions and minimise 
the need for personal preferences. News, therefore, reflect the framework of understanding in 
the socio-cultural and political environment of journalists and their audiences. Or as Berkowitz 
(2011:xv) puts it, ‘news reflects the culture of its creation, both within and outside of a news 
organisation.’  
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This analysis of condensational symbols in British press coverage of Boko Haram 
focuses on a particular act of terrorism, the bombing of the UN House in Abuja. However, to 
provide a more longitudinal perspective on the British press coverage of Nigeria, the article 
evaluates the representation of Nigeria in British newspapers in August 2010 to highlight the 
nature of coverage a year before the defining moment of August 2011, the focus of this article. 
Following up on that evaluation, this article concentrates on all news stories about Boko 
Haram that were published in British newspapers before the bombing of the UN House as well 
as reports of the attack. Articles were acquired electronically from Proquest online database 
using two simple keyword search terms, ‘Nigeria’ and ‘Boko Haram.’ The first search 
generated data about routine coverage of Nigeria and the second produced information about 
Boko Haram within a specific time frame. The objective was to identify the nature of coverage 
in the absence of a ‘what a story moment’ and of an event-centred news.  
 
Terrorism and the news media, a contested relationship 
Journalists, studies have shown (Fursich, 2010, Thomas, 2014), tend to favour stories that 
resonate with their audiences due to their perceived cultural background, especially when 
such reports are about unexpected and dramatic events.  Acts of terrorism by their nature 
easily lend themselves to extensive media coverage because as Cottee and Hayward 
(2011:966) have noted, terrorism ‘involves the deliberate infliction of physical harm or injury on 
human beings.’ Although Russell Farnen, writing before the defining event of 9/11, describes 
terrorism as a ‘mainly international problem’ and argues that terror is ‘distant and beyond the 
average person’s experience’ (Farnen, 1990:103), terrorism has occupied the attention of 
scholars since the 1960s and informed research in a variety of disciplines. Terrorism is not a 
new social problem and as Biernatzki (2002) has noted, it is embedded in history. However, it 
could be argued that ‘what we know as terrorism is actually a media creation; mass media 
define, delimit, delegitimize, and discredit events that we have not actually seen, but that we 
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all instantly recognise as terrorist acts’ (Farnen (1990:100). Consequently, the intersection of 
terrorism and mass media has influenced public perception and understanding of the 
phenomenon.   
Stories of terrorism go back a long way but their reach has been widen due to the 
capacity of the mass media to disseminate information about terrorists and their activities. 
Thus, the political impact of terrorist attacks has increased significantly. While terrorist 
organisations no longer rely solely on mainstream media to publicise their activities, but now 
have the capacity to deliver their messages directly to audiences through social media, in the 
contemporary world, the news media are still major battlefields for the propagation of 
information and terrorism and news media are intricately connected. It could be argued that 
the news media validate and legitimise terrorist acts through coverage of such events. As a 
result, news organisations are implicated in the dissemination of information about acts of 
terrorism even in distant places ‘because most people only experience terrorism through 
mass-media accounts’ (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006:431). However, this does not suggest a 
causal link between media coverage and terrorism or postulate shared values between 
journalists and terrorists. But as Paul Wilkinson notes, ‘for as long as terrorists commit acts of 
violence the mass media will continue to scramble to cover them in order to satisfy the desire 
of their audiences for dramatic stories in which there is inevitably huge public curiosity about 
both the victimisers and their victims’ (1997:53). Journalists cover acts of terrorism to justify 
their public role to inform, educate and set the agenda for issues of interest to their audience 
and not simply to serve the cause of terrorists despite the symbiotic nature of the relationship 
between news media and terrorist organisations.  
 
Background: Nigeria and terrorism 
To contextualise this analysis of Boko Haram’s attack on the UN House in Nigeria, it is critical 
to provide a backdrop by examining the issue of terrorism in the country. As a starting point, it 
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is important for the purpose of this article to clarify the definition of terrorism that informs this 
analysis. The term is used here to denote a particular type of violence that:  
 
Is premeditated and designed to create a climate of extreme fear; is directed at a wider 
target than the immediate victims;  inherently involves attacks on random or symbolic 
targets, including civilians; is considered by the society in which it occurs as 'extra-
normal', that is in the literal sense that it violates the norms regulating disputes, protest 
and dissent; and is used primarily, though not exclusively, to influence the political 
behaviour of governments, communities or specific social groups (Wilkinson, 1977:51) 
 
 
In this particular case, it is violence that is associated with religion for political purposes. 
Although Nigerians have experienced different forms of acts of violence for decades, terrorism 
did not ‘exist’ in the country because it was not acknowledged as a socio-political problem until 
Boko Haram emerged as a dominant security threat. In 2009 when Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 
young Nigerian student, attempted to bomb a US-bound aircraft with explosives that he had 
stockpiled in his underwear, many Nigerian elite distanced him and his action from his country 
and asserted that ‘Nigerians do not have terrorist tendencies’ (Ette, 2012:53). This claim was 
made in spite of a long history of acts of violence, especially in the northern parts of the 
country, which is home to radical Islam. In the 1970s, for example, an extremist group, the 
Maitatsine movement, had mobilised unemployed urban youth and other marginalised people 
under an Islamic flag for a campaign of violence in Kano, a major northern city. Thousands of 
lives were lost and property worth millions of naira was destroyed. Occasional spate of 
violence in other northern cities such as Bauchi, Yola, and Kaduna also resulted in the loss of 
lives but these were not understood as manifestations of terrorism. 
The Maitatsine group, which was started by Mohammadu Marwa, a Cameroonian who 
migrated to Kano in 1945, was known for an anti-Western ideological stance. The group 
sought to impose a strict Islamic agenda on Nigeria with its leader preaching against Western 
culture and the use of modern technologies such as automobiles, radio and wristwatches 
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(Musa, 2012). Members of the group distanced themselves from other Muslims, who had, in 
their view, become secular by accepting Western influences. Agbiboa (2014:50) explains that 
Maitatsine members ‘lived in secluded areas to avoid mixing with mainstream Muslims, and 
rejected material wealth on the grounds that it was associated with Western values.’ In 
December 1980, the group engaged in violent clashes with security forces for eleven days 
during which more than 4000 people were killed (Agbiboa, 2014). Although Marwa, the leader 
of the group, was killed during the uprising, his followers kept his doctrines alive for several 
years and engaged in sporadic clashes with security forces. Aliyu Musa (2012:113) makes the 
point that an outbreak of religious violence in 1985 in Bauchi, a northern city, ‘was the last 
major violence directly linked to the Maitatsine sect.’  
While several groups have spearheaded intermittent uprisings in Nigeria since the 1985 
crisis, Boko Haram is the first group to manifest traits similar to those of the Maitatsine. 
Members of Boko Haram expound radical views and contempt for Western civilization similar 
to those that were associated with the Maitatsine group. They, too, preach against Western 
way of life and values and campaign to spread extremist Islamist ideas across Nigeria through 
violence. Musa (2012) argues that Boko Haram is an offshoot of Maitatsine but unlike the 
latter has access to modern technology with which it is able to coordinate its activities and 
consequently has been more successful in waging a campaign of violence in some parts of 
Nigeria.   
 
The exact origin of Boko Haram is shrouded in historical fog but it is generally believed to 
have emerged in the late 1990s. Ajayi, (2012), traces its beginnings to Shabaab Muslim Youth 
Organisation, which was started in 1995 but Andrew Walker, (2012), a freelance journalist 
who has covered Nigeria since 2006, in a special report for the United States Institute of 
Peace, links it to a radical Islamist youth group in Maiduguri, which was formed in 2002.  
Although Boko Haram was initially perceived to be a non-violent organisation, under 
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Mohammed Yusuf’s leadership the group gradually evolved and embarked on a campaign to 
propagate extremist Islamic ideology in Nigeria. Officially known as Jama’atu Ahlissunnah 
Iidda’awati wal Jihad, meaning ‘people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s 
teachings and Jihad’, it quickly became better known as Boko Haram, which implies ‘Western 
education is sacrilege’  in the Hausa language, the most widely spoken language in northern 
Nigeria,  due to its anti-Western ideology and hard-line Islamic principles. The popular label, 
Abubakar (2012:98) explains, ‘sticks mainly because the public prefers it partly as a way of 
ridiculing the group and partly because it seems to fit into the group’s outward ideological 
outlook.’ But it should be noted that the group is not simply opposed to Western education but 
to Western way of life. As John Campbell (2011), a former United States ambassador to 
Nigeria, explains, Boko Haram also opposes any sort of secular government.  
While its origin may be in dispute, there is no question about Boko Haram’s campaign of 
terror in Nigeria. It has claimed responsibility for more violence in Nigeria than any other 
armed group (Agbiboa, 2014) but more importantly, its activities threaten Nigeria’s national 
security and stability. It has led a violent campaign for many years against the Nigerian state 
to advance its ideological position and rejection of Western modernity, which it sees as the 
underlying cause of social problems in its Islamic environment. However, in spite of its record 
of terrorist acts it remained invisible in British newspapers until July 2009.  
 
Nigeria in British newspapers 
British press coverage of Nigeria generally constitutes a small proportion of its foreign news. 
In the absence of major disasters, conflict or other event-centred news, coverage is often very 
sketchy and limited. This was the case in August 2010, a year before the bombing of the UN 
House. A search through Proquest using ‘Nigeria’ as a search term generated sixty-four 
relevant stories in national, regional and local newspapers. Twenty-eight of the stories were 
about Nigerian footballers playing for British teams, seven stories were on the economy and 
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the government’s plans to privatise the state-run power generation and distribution company. 
Twenty-five of the stories were news in brief and were not by-lined and four were about Shell, 
the Anglo-Saxon oil company.  Three of the Shell stories were extensive reports by national 
newspapers about oil spillage and attack on pipelines. Other stories published during the 
period included a case of an internet scam traced to Nigeria, the kidnap of the son of the first 
president of Nigeria, which interestingly was only covered by local newspapers,  and sham 
marriages.  
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that news stories about Nigeria a year before the bombing of the 
UN House were insignificant and probably used to achieve a certain level of composition of 
coverage. It could be argued that beyond the ‘narrow prism of famine, war and corruption’ 
(Franks, 2013:168), Nigeria, like many non- Western countries, received limited coverage 
because news of distant places are often nuanced by disaster and crises. The extensive 
coverage of the attack on the UN House confirmed this view.  
 
Boko Haram in the British press 
Boko Haram gained international media attention in 2009 when Yusuf, its leader, led an 
insurrection against the Nigerian government during which many ‘police, low-level government 
officials, and Christian clergy were murdered until the Nigerian army, with great difficulty, 
suppressed it and handed over Yusuf to the police who murdered him while in custody’ 
(Campbell, 2011:54). Before the uprising the group was not identified by its popular label in 
any British newspaper. A clear example of the invisibility of Boko Haram in British press prior 
to 2009 was the lack of coverage of several waves of violence it perpetrated in parts of 
Northern Nigeria, especially during the 2007 general election, and for a few days in July 2009 
prior to the killing of its leader. Although hundreds of lives had been lost, the group was not 
mentioned in British newspapers until Yusuf was killed while in police custody. Onapajo and 
 13 
Uzodike (2012:24-25) argue that ‘the government’s mishandling of the group’s terrorist 
activities by the summary execution of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and the arrant use of 
force on its members, intensified the belligerence of the Boko Haram group.’ Consequently, 
the killing earned the group visibility in international media. This could be because his death 
fitted into the abuse of human rights news frame. 
Between 28 and 31 July, 2009, fourteen stories about the group were published in The 
Financial Times, The Guardian, The Independent, The Evening Standard and The Times. All 
the stories focused on the death of Yusuf as reflected in the headlines: ‘Nigerian Islamic 
leader shot dead’, ‘Nigeria police kill rebel leader’, ‘Islamist sect leader dies in Nigerian police 
custody’, ‘Leader of violent Nigerian sect shot in police custody’, ‘Islamist sect leader killed by 
Nigerian army.’ The last headline was erroneous given that Yusuf died while he was in police 
custody, after he was handed over by the army. 
Yusuf’s death followed days of mayhem, which Abdullahi Abubakar (2012) attributes to 
unprovoked attack on the group by the police in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri. Abubakar 
writes: 
It was in mid-2009 when their members were on a peaceful funeral procession in the city 
that police reportedly attacked and killed some of them. They demanded instant justice 
but saw no sign of it. They then launched revenge attacks, not only in Borno State but 
also in Bauchi, Yobe and Kano States, killing policemen, burning public buildings, 
churches and police stations and snatching arms and ammunitions (2012:98).  
 
As noted before, this outbreak of violence did not receive international media coverage until 
Yusuf was killed by security forces. Reports of the violent clash that led to his death only 
served as background information in the coverage of his killing. For example, the Western 
Morning News, a regional newspaper based in Plymouth, reported that: 
 
THE leader of a radical Nigerian Islamist sect blamed for violent clashes between his 
followers and government forces has been shot dead in police custody. Mohammed 
Yusuf, the head of the Nigerian Taliban, was killed after being captured on Thursday at 
the end of a four-day manhunt (01 August, 2009:19) 
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The day before, the Western Morning News story and The Financial Times, had reported 
that Yusuf was killed after five days of fighting between security forces and members of Boko 
Haram:  
 
The leader of an Islamist sect at the centre of five days of fighting in northern Nigeria 
that has claimed hundreds of lives died in police custody last night.  
Mohammed Yusuf was killed hours after he was captured, according to police officials 
quoted by news agencies.  
Mr Yusuf's death followed an assault on a mosque housing followers of the radical 
preacher, who demanded stricter imposition of sharia, or Islamic law, across northern 
Nigeria and the abandonment of secular education.  
In retaliation for a series of attacks on police stations and other targets that had spread 
to four states since erupting on Sunday, troops closed in on an area of the city of 
Maiduguri, the base of the sect whose name - Boko Haram - means "western education 
is forbidden". Unconfirmed estimates of the death toll ranged from 300 to 600 people 
(The Financial Times, 31 July, 2009:4)   
 
It is clear from the excerpt above that the five days of fighting that resulted in the death of 
hundreds of people did not merit international news coverage but the death of the leader of 
the group at the centre of the uprising was considered newsworthy. The choice of words in the 
excerpt also points to a suggestion of judgment of the action of the security forces through the 
use of phrases such as ‘an assault on mosque ’, ‘retaliation’ ‘closed in on an area.’ One could, 
therefore, argue that the emphasis on the death of Yusuf and not so much on the hundreds of 
victims of his group’s attack suggests a certain level of sympathy for the group. The Financial 
Times, for example, reported that the Nigerian army killed up to ‘600 Islamist militants’ and 
The Guardian explained that:  
Troops were last night on a door to door hunt for Islamist militants after government 
forces stormed the base of a self-styled Taliban leader and killed him and more than 
100 rebels in an attempt to crush an uprising that has racked Nigeria.  
A local rights group accused security forces of killing unarmed captives alleged to be 
members of the radical Boko Haram sect seeking to overthrow the government and 
impose sharia law across Nigeria (The Guardian, 31 July 2009:22). 
  
What becomes clear from the above is a criticism of the action of security forces in their 
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encounter with Boko Haram. This could be due to lack of coverage of the sect prior to the July 
2009 outbreak of violence, which inevitably meant adopting an episodic rather than a thematic 
approach. This sympathetic leaning disappeared in later coverage, as will be discussed later.  
Following that spate of violent clash between its members and security forces and the 
death of its leader, Boko Haram received sporadic visibility in the British press. Frequent 
attacks on churches, police stations, leisure centres ensured intermittent coverage. However, 
it was the bombing of the UN House in 2011 that gained the group unparalleled coverage in 
British newspapers. The attack was reported extensively by local, regional and national 
newspapers. It was apparent that while it was a local and ‘distant’ act of terrorism on a spatial 
level, its impact was global and this was reflected in the way in which British newspapers 
framed the interplay of the local and the international perspectives. As Onapajo and Uzodike 
(2012:348) note: ‘The thick flames and shattered bodies that accompanied the group’s brutal 
attack on the UN building on 26 August 2011 sent a red alert to the world. It clearly indicates 
that Boko Haram’s potential targets for attack are not limited to Nigerian authorities and its 
peoples, rather its targets are transnational and multinational in nature.’ This was clear in a 
statement the group issued after the attack:  
 
All over the world, the UN is a global partner in the oppression of believers. We are at 
war against infidels.  In Nigeria, the Federal Government tries to perpetuate the agenda 
of the United Nations.... We have told everyone that the UN is the bastion of the global 
oppression of Muslims all over the world (Onapajo and Uzodike, 2012:35). 
 
Boko Haram disseminated this message through the media thus reinforcing the view that 
‘terrorists exploit the media to achieve political recognition, present their cause, transmit 
messages and demands to the government, and induce fear in the general public’ (Keinan, 
Sadeh and Rosen, 2003:150). Ironically, it depended on Western technology to convey its 
threat. 
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The UN as a supranational organisation congregates representatives from different parts 
of the world. It could therefore be argued that the bombing of its headquarters was an attack 
on the world. Although international media coverage of Boko Haram had been on the increase 
since 2009, the group was not viewed by Western governments as a potential security threat 
beyond Nigeria. But as the US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security 
noted in a report, ‘the attack marked a significant shift in the targeting and goals’ and signalled 
an evolution in its capabilities (US House of Representatives, 2011). The US Subcommittee 
on Counterterrorism and Intelligence asserted that Boko Haram was capable of attacking US 
interests and the US homeland. This view was reinforced by a report in The Evening Times 
(Glasgow), which claimed that some of the people behind the bombing ‘were even plotting to 
carry out attacks in the United States’ (02 September 2011: 10).  
Initial reports of the attack in British newspapers were episodic and focused mainly on 
the attention-grabbing incident. The stories expanded the reach of the terrorist act as the 
media spread the effect of the spatially limited act to a wide public. Boko Haram was 
successful in gaining publicity through its appeal to news values such as tragedy, magnitude 
and unexpectedness. The reports were undergirded by a dominant discourse of conflict, which 
is routinely simplistic due to the nature of journalism. As Philip Hammond (2007:2) has 
argued, ‘reporters do not work in a vacuum: their writing will be influenced by the stock of 
ideas circulating in the culture in which they are working, particularly those which are taken up 
and promulgated by powerful sources.’ Those ideas provide layers of meaning about their 
subjects as illustrated in the next section. 
 
Condensational symbols in the coverage of Boko Haram’s attack on the 
UN House. 
British newspapers used a selection of symbolic phrases in their coverage of the bombing of 
the UN House to make sense of the incident for their readers. The Evening Standard was the 
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first and only British newspaper to carry a report on the attack on the day it happened. Its story 
headlined:  ‘Suicide car bomb destroys UN base in Nigeria’ provided a detailed account of 
how the attack happened and concluded that ‘there was no immediate claim of responsibility, 
but an Islamist group known as Boko Haram has been blamed for a number of bombings in 
recent months’ (Dominiczak, 2011:22). Although Boko Haram was the primary suspect, the 
bombing could have been launched by another group given that a devastating bomb attack 
the previous year during the country’s 50th Independence Day celebration was carried out by 
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, a militant group in the country’s oil-
rich delta region. The day after the bomb attack, twenty-three newspapers ranging from The 
Huddersfield Daily Examiner, a local newspaper in a university town, to the Daily Telegraph, 
one of UK’s national titles, carried detailed reports of the bombing and many referred to Boko 
Haram as the main suspect. The Guardian newspaper, in addition to a news story also 
published an analysis by Alex Vine, the head of the Africa programme at Chatham House, an 
independent policy institute in London. The scope of the coverage was emblematic – the 
attack on the UN House was as Vines noted: ‘the first such attack aimed at an international 
organisation, possibly to provoke a counter-productive international security response’ (The 
Guardian, 27 August, 2011:28). The broad response of the British press confirmed that the 
bombing was not just a Nigerian problem, that the act of terrorism was not a distant 
occurrence. This view was reflected in The Guardian’s main story, which reported that ‘The 
Islamist group Boko Haram told the BBC in a phone call that it had carried out the attack. If the 
claim turns out to be genuine, the attack would confirm American fears that al-Qaida-affiliated 
groups are targeting the important West African state’ (The Guardian, 27 August, 2011). The 
international dimension of the attack was also noted by The Financial Times:  
The claim of responsibility by the Islamist group marks an escalation in what has 
hitherto been a localised campaign of violence. It carries ramifications for international 
businesses and organisations operating in Africa's most populous country.  
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We believe it represents an expansion in the scope of Islamist militant attacks from the 
symbols of the domestic Nigerian state - such as police stations and government 
buildings - to include the country's international presence," an analyst at Control Risks 
said of the blast. (August 27, 2011:8) 
 
Prior to Boko Haram claiming responsibility for the bombing, majority of the reports were 
cautious in linking the group to the attack. The headlines reflected this caution as many were 
straightforward descriptors: ‘Car bomb attack,’ ‘Car bomb attack rocks UN building.’ ‘18 dead 
in UN building bombing,’ ‘Assault on Abuja,’ ‘Suicide car bomber kills 18 at UN AID HQ.’ The 
Nottingham Evening Post, a local newspaper, in a story headlined: ‘Bomb kills 16 at UN HQ’ 
reported that:   
AT least 16 people have died after a car laden with explosives blew up at the United 
Nations' offices in Nigeria.  
The attack yesterday saw a car ram through two gates at the offices in the capital, 
Abuja, before blowing up.  
The suicide bomber inside crashed the car into the main reception area and detonated 
the explosives, inflicting the most damage possible, a spokesman for the Nigerian 
National Emergency Management Agency said.  
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called it "an assault on those who devote their 
lives to helping others".  
UN deputy spokesman Farhan Haq said: "We do not have any confirmation as yet who 
was responsible” (Nottingham Evening Post, 27 August, 2011: 30).  
 
However, Boko Haram ruled out other suspects when it claimed responsibility for the 
attack and consequently the papers replaced the cautionary approach with a more direct 
perspective and used condensational symbols to simplify the story for their readers. The 
recurring phrases were: ‘Islamist sect’, ‘Islamist extremists’, ‘Nigerian Taliban’, ‘Extremist 
Islamist sect’, ‘Nigerian extremist group’, ‘radical Islamist sect’, ‘Linked to al-Qaeda.’ A day 
after the attack The Times reported ‘Deadly rise of the ‘Taleban of Nigeria’ and this reference 
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to the Taliban was used extensively even though Boko Haram has no known links to the 
Afghan group. The Daily Mirror was one of the first newspapers to emphasis an ‘al’-Qaeda’ 
link. In a story on 27 August 2011 the paper reported that Boko Haram ‘was said to be trying 
to link up with al-Qaeda’ but the headline was more categorical about the connection: ‘18 DIE 
AS SUICIDE CAR BOMBER TARGETS U.N: Al-Qaeda link to horror.’ Although there was no 
evidence of a working relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist organisations, the 
papers emphasised a connection in their reports. The evidence for this claim appears to have 
been a suggestion by General Carter Ham, the commander for US military operations in 
Africa, who said in July 2011 that ‘the sect might be trying to link with two al-Qaeda affiliated 
groups in other African countries to mount joint attacks in Nigeria’ (The Financial Times, 27 
August:8). 
The repeated use of  ‘Islamist sect’, ‘Islamist extremists’, ‘Nigerian Taliban’, ‘Extremist 
Islamist sect’, ‘Nigerian extremist group’, ‘radical Islamist sect’, ‘Linked to al-Qaeda and even 
‘Boko Haram’ conjured up a particular discourse, the rise of Islamist fanaticism, and narrowed 
the understanding of the complexity of the Boko Haram threat to Nigeria’s national security. 
These symbolic labels provided a simplistic explanation for Boko Haram’s activities because 
most British newspaper readers were already aware of the ‘Taliban’ and al-Qaeda and what 
they represented. The phrases evoked shared memories and understanding and served as 
shorthand terms and codes for journalists. For journalists who were writing for readers with 
limited knowledge of Boko Haram, the use of those phrases enabled them to make emotional 
connection with their readers, set the boundaries of discourse and consequently influence 
public understanding of the attack. The point could be made that public understanding of Boko 
Haram’s assault was coloured by the cultural and socio-political perspectives delineated by 
the press. When journalists described Boko Haram as the Taliban of Nigeria with links to al-
Qaeda, they were providing a particular frame of reference for their readers and associating 
Nigeria with Afghanistan, Iraq and the war on terror. This link placed the activities of Boko 
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Haram primarily in the realm of the war on terror but paradoxically the link did not frame 
Nigeria  as a member of the international security community but as a threat to it.  
It is reasonable to understand the condensational symbols as straight-forward 
descriptors in the sense that Boko Haram is an Islamist sect that has been campaigning for 
full implementation of sharia in Nigeria; but it was too simplistic to accept the al-Qaeda 
connection as reality without evidence. Moreover, the group’s claim of a link to al-Qaeda has 
been described as a ‘mere slogan given the members’ apparent non-comprehension of key 
Islamic teachings…let alone its complex sharia code’ (Abubakar (2012:98) and their 
appropriation of the ‘Taliban’ label could be seen as being more aspirational than reality 
because there is no confirmation that it has real links with the Afghan and Pakistani sects.  
Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to conclude that the use of those symbolic labels 
suggested implicit judgement about the group. The reference to al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
emphasised religion as the driving force behind Boko Haram’s violence. It reduced the conflict 
to a confrontation between Muslims and the State even though it was common knowledge that 
Boko Haram was not averse to attacking Muslims.  
What the ethno-religious frame alludes to is problematic because it diverts attention from 
more critical issues. Perceptive observers of Nigeria’s socio-political problems are aware that 
the Boko Haram phenomenon is indicative of the group’s success at mobilising people who 
feel marginalised and alienated due to extreme poverty and deprivation that pervade the 
northern part of Nigeria, their regional base. Musa (2012: 115) for example, argues that 
‘Nigeria’s economic situation had played a substantial role in the emergence of violent groups 
across the country since the early 1980s.’ Jean Herskovits, a leading analyst of Nigerian 
politics, in a piece published by the New York Times, argued that: ‘the root cause of violence 
and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness’ (02 
January 2012). In an earlier article, Herskovits had made the point that Boko Haram was not 
the product of Islamist fundamentalism but the outcome of the ‘country’s corrupt and self-
 21 
serving government. This nuanced view of the Boko Haram and its campaign of violence 
contradict the discourse invoked by the use of condensational symbols in reports of its attack 
on the UN headquarters. The simplistic view evoked by the use of the symbols provided cues 
for a particular understanding of the problem primarily as an ethno-religious problem.  
While Islamic fundamentalism is not peculiar to Nigeria, the coverage pointed to the 
‘othering of Nigeria. This was explicit in a report in the Western Press on 03 September 2011, 
which claimed that ‘the rapid release from detention’ of four men who were caught with 
explosives ‘was apparently aimed at placating Muslims groups. Some of those arrested were 
said to be plotting to carry out attacks in the United States.’ The allegation of complicity of the 
Nigerian government in the release of terrorists plotting to attack the United States, a country 
that is almost paranoid about its national security, echoed suggestions that Boko Haram’s 
success was due to the religious conflict in Nigeria. However, Herskovits attributes the 
popularity of Boko Haram to ‘flagrant lack of concern on the part of those who govern for the 
welfare of the governed.’ Herskovits notes that: 
 
Ten years of supposed democracy have yielded mounting poverty and deprivation of 
every kind in Nigeria. Young people, undereducated by a collapsed educational 
system, may ‘graduate,’ but only into joblessness. Lives decline, frustration grows, and 
angry young men are too easily persuaded to pick up readily accessible guns in protest 
when something sparks their rage (www.ForeignPolicy.com, 03 August, 2009)  
 
A better understanding of the Boko Haram phenomenon calls for more contextualised 
reporting of its activities and a rejection of simplistic news frames that echo preconceived 
notions of terrorism as a distant problem.  
  
Conclusion 
Although the bombing of the UN House in Nigeria was a ‘distant’ event for the British 
newspaper readers, the event had global significance. The attack was a local manifestation of 
a problem that drives the global ‘war on terror.’ However, the newspapers, through the use of 
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symbolic phrases that were culturally sensitive and reflective of a Western perspective 
‘framed’ a particular narrative for their readers and helped to shape a particular understanding 
of the event. The frames reinforced the view that coverage of the developing world by Western 
press is often triggered by crises and disasters. Boko Haram had existed for more than a 
decade and had engaged in spates of violence for many years without attracting international 
media attention but when the group attacked an international target it gained unprecedented 
coverage in British newspapers. The incident was deemed newsworthy even by British local 
newspapers because it met several news values.  Although the symbolic language used to 
frame the news reports appear to be straight forward description, it reinforced and evoked a 
particular understanding of terrorism. Moreover, the symbolic labels shaped the dominant 
definition of the event and ruled out alternative frames. The coverage reflected discourses of 
violence embedded in Western perception of distant places such as Nigeria and depended on 
familiar news frames that magnified that understanding. The news framing of acts of violence 
by Boko Haram enforced the ‘othering’ of Nigeria because the symbols were codes that 
suggested that Nigeria was at risk of becoming an African Afghanistan.  
Condensational symbols have strong appeal for journalists especially for the coverage of 
faraway events due to their capacity to simplify a complex story and provide a view of conflict 
that resonates with Western readers. Moreover, as Chermak and Gruenewald (2006:436) 
argue, the media tend to ‘emphasise the dramatic, most violent, and conflictual terrorist 
accounts, and ignore historical, cultural, and social explanations for terrorism.’ Utilising 
symbolic labels that located Nigeria within the Islamic world somehow made Boko Haram’s 
atrocities comprehensible and discernible. The seemingly ‘natural’ labels framed a specific 
interpretation of the bombing, reinforced the notion of distance and underpinned the image of 
Nigeria as the ‘other’. The coverage oversimplified and sensationalised a complex story as the 
use of symbolic labels obscured the complexity of the problem expressed through Boko 
Haram’s activities. It conveyed the sense that Nigeria’s insecurity was the result of innate 
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ethno-religious conflict. While Boko Haram clearly fits into the ‘religious and evangelical 
political spectrum’ (Farnen, 1990), its activities cannot be attributed simply to ethno-religious 
conflict because its victims are not only non-Muslims. The dynamics of Boko Haram’s acts of 
terrorism go beyond religious conflict and must be understood as a reflection of a compelling 
sense of alienation and marginalisation and the failure of the Nigerian state. 
As this study has suggested, Boko Haram represents what the Oxford Research Group 
conceptualises as ‘revolt from the margins.’ The group has been successful in mobilising 
support of Muslims in many parts of northern Nigeria by occupying the space left by the state. 
The failure of Western education, for example, to provide an escape from poverty and 
deprivation seems to justify the group’s rejection of Western values. Consequently, it has been 
successful in harnessing the frustration of marginalised people to challenge the authority of 
the Nigerian state. Agbiboa (2014) has suggested that the most effective way to tackle the 
terrorist group must entail addressing the socio-economic inequalities and deprivation in the 
regional base of Boko Haram. The rise and success of Boko Haram in terrorising Nigeria is 
undoubtedly due to a variety of factors, including the weakness of the state and inefficiency of 
the security system. This understanding was not reflected in the reports of the group’s attack 
on the UN building because it did not fit into the episodic frame that underpinned the British 
press coverage of the group.  The use of stock labels limited the understanding of a multi-
faceted problem and emphasised a one dimensional perspective. 
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